Recognizing an Other ego is something we beings do often and fairly well. It is also a primitive condition for communication and, thus, for being understood. However, it is also problematic. In arguments about understanding, about the ability of one to understand an Other, it is sometimes claimed that ego (or, in non-Husserlian jargon, self) is situated within a set of experiences, the scope of which it can never transcend. To me, this seems too strong. An ego (self) must be able to transcend what belongs to it, its own experiences, or its world is solipsistic. The following is, I think, a good defense against solipsism.
In order to silence solipsism, the problematic of how one ego constitutes an Other ego should be framed in this way: First, accept the assumption that experiences, particular instances of personally encountering or undergoing something, are always of an object or objects. Next, accept the assumption that experiences of an object or objects must be had by something. Next, think of an ego as that which experiences, or that which has an experience, or the subject of an experience or experiences. Now, consider this passage:
“I am aware of my own body and thoughts, and I have some amount of control over both these things. I can control what I think and talk about. I can move my arms, stand up and sit down, and touch or pick-up objects that surround me when and how I want to. I have all of these experiences. I am an ego.”
With this passage and its preceding assumptions in mind, we can enter the problematic. Consider these questions: How does one ego understand that something else has experiences, i.e., how does one ego understand whether some thing other than itself is an ego too? How do I understand that another being is aware of its own body and thoughts, has similar control over its actions, and has experiences in remotely the same way as me? How does one ego recognize an Other ego?
Edmund Husserl approaches this problem phenomenologically. In the following, I will characterize Husserl's answer to the above questions as such: for an ego, other egos are constituted by evidence given for them; such evidence is obtained by an ego through a three step process; the steps of this process are: 1) “abstractive reduction”, 2) “ego-body identification”, and 3) “analogical apperception”.
Abstractive reduction is performed by an ego and can be described as a setting-off-to-the-side of certain experiences and facts about the world; Husserl describes it as a sort of epoché, a sort of bracketing. Abstractive reduction requires an ego to set off to the side, or suspend belief in the existence of, experiences and facts the about the world that are co-determined, that is, determined by the ego itself and other egos. Through this reduction, the ego takes an attitude toward the world in which it, the ego, acknowledges as existent only those experiences and facts about the world that it itself solely determines. This includes experiences and facts like whether or not the ego itself is feeling or seeing something; in general, this includes the ego's own subjective experiences of the world. This excludes experiences and facts like whether or not the ego believes something else is feeling or seeing something; in general, this excludes the ego's belief that subjective experiences of the world other than its own can be had. An ego in this attitude is said to be in “the sphere of ownness”. A description of what certain experiences would be like for an ego in “the sphere of ownness” might help clarify the nature of this attitude.
While in “the sphere of ownness” I would not experience a fresh red apple as being tasty for anyone other than me. In “the sphere of ownness” I would not experience a foreign language (or anything spoken by anyone other than me) as having any meaning. In “the sphere of ownness” I would not experience other people as persons, in the sense that I think of myself as a person. I would not experience them, other people, as being the subjects of experiences; I would not experience them as egos. Consider the difference between how the experience of being the sole survivor of a global disaster or catastrophe would be for an ego in “the sphere of ownness” and how it would be for an ego not in “the sphere of ownness”. While in “the sphere of ownness” the subjective experiences had by other people and conscious animals is not given any existential sense. Thus, if, while in “the sphere of ownness”, I am the sole survivor of a global disaster or catastrophe, I would not think that any experience of the world which was similar to mine had been lost. Whereas if I were not in “the sphere of ownness” and such a disaster or catastrophe happened, I might say to myself, “Gee, I wish my brother, or my friend Kelly, were here to share this experience with me,” since I'd believe they could have done so had they been alive.
The effect of the abstractive reduction can be described as a purified, isolated, egocentric, subjective experience an ego which has performed the reduction has of the world; a key constituent of this experience is the experience the ego has of its own physical body, i.e., the ego's experience of ego-body identification. Consider this: I, as an ego in “the sphere of ownness”, experience the ability to, through various modes of perception like touch, taste, audition, and kinesthesis, perceive my body. I can touch, taste, hear, and/or sense the position of my body. But that's not all. I also experience having an active influence on certain aspects of the way these perceptions are carried out. I can choose to touch my body with my hands or my feet; I can choose to taste my body now or later; I can choose to perform various actions that result in sounds and, thus, hear the sounds of my body; I can choose to move my body, and, however I move it, I'll know the position it is in while and after I move it. In this way, I experience myself as animate and as having a certain amount of control over my animation. So, I experience myself as having a psychic part or layer. Thus, I experience myself as a “psychophysical animate organism”.
Now, this experience, the experience an ego has of itself as a psychophysical animate organism while in “the sphere of ownness”, is the basis of an ego's “perception” of other egos; but an ego does not perceive, in the proper sense of the word, other egos; an ego analogically apperceives other egos. Analogical apperception can be thought of in this way: an ego transfers its sense of its experience of itself as a psychophysical animate organism to a perceived (in the proper sense of the word) thing, usually an animate organism. Such a transfer gives the ego a sense that that perceived thing (let’s assume it is an animate organism) is a psychophysical animate organism, i.e., that that perceived thing has a psychic layer to it, a psychic layer which is analogous to the ego's own.
For further clarification, consider this: while in “the sphere of ownness”, if I experience another human being, I will not experience that person as being the subject of experiences, that is, as being an ego; but if I exit “the sphere of ownness”, I will experience another human being as being the subject of experiences, that is, as being an ego. The reason I experience the other human being as being an ego is just that I analogically apperceive him or her; the reason I experience the other human being as being an ego is just that I experience him or her as being like me in the way I experienced myself while in “the sphere of ownness”, as being a psychophysical animate organism. Again, I experience another human as being the subject of experiences because I experience him or her as being like me, or an analog of me, as I experienced myself as a psychophysical animate organism while in “the sphere of ownness”. Yet again, rephrased for further clarity and force, I experience another human being as being the subject of experiences because I experience him or her as being a kind of Other me, a kind of Other psychophysical animate organism which, while in “the sphere of ownness”, I experienced myself to be, but which is not me and yet is present, is existent, with me.
The experience an ego has of itself as a psychophysical animate organism is ongoing; this experience does not stop. When other egos come into the picture, i.e., when an ego analogically apperceives other egos, a phenomenon called pairing occurs. Pairing is a feature of an ego's experience of an object which necessarily occurs when that ego experiences that object as similar to or associated with another object; the similarity or association between objects gives the ego perceiving the objects a sense that the objects are a sort of singularity or a unity, namely a pair. Pairing necessarily occurs in an ego's analogical apperception of an Other ego. An ego analogically apperceives an Other ego, an ego experiences an analog or likeness of itself, namely an Other ego; so, since this Other ego is experienced as an analog or likeness by the first ego, the first ego, the analogically apperceiving ego, experiences the Other as being similar to or associated with it and, thus, necessarily experiences itself and the Other ego as a pair.
A key feature of analogical apperception is the difference between apperception and perception (proper). This difference highlights the evidence an ego has for the existence of Other egos and the difference between this evidence and the evidence the ego has for other non-psychophysical organisms or objects. The difference between apperception and perception is that the subject who is apperceiving an object is not perceiving all parts of that object, yet the subject believes that all parts of that object are there, intact in that object. A great example is the apperception of a can of soup. When a subject perceives a can of soup (assuming it is an unopened can of soup) the subject does not perceive the soup. The subject only perceives (proper) the can (and only one side of the can at that!) and the label on the can and the words on the label and so on. But the subject believes the thing is a can of soup; so, the subject apperceives it as a can of soup. That is to say, the subject has, over time, experienced that objects which are like this one now perceived usually have soup in them and, thus, are cans of soup. So, the subject takes a small leap of faith and assumes that the object it now sees is a can of soup. But the subject could be wrong; there could be no soup. However, in order to know whether the object is a can of soup or merely an empty can, the subject is able to open it up and check! The subject is able to verify that it is a can of soup through perception (proper)! Thus, the subject may have complete evidence that the object is a can of soup. This is not the case in an ego's apperception of Other egos. An ego necessarily has incomplete evidence for the existence of Other egos. An ego cannot get inside another psychophysical animate organism and experience the ego of that organism. Necessarily, the only psychophysical animate organism an ego can experience from the inside out is itself. Thus, the only way an ego can verify, the only evidence an ego has for the existence of an Other ego or egos is the analogical transfer of the ego's experience of itself as a psychophysical animate organism, as had in “the sphere of ownness”, to another object (usually another animate organism). That is to say, necessarily the only evidence an ego can have for the existence of an Other ego is an experience of likeness or similarity between itself and the Other ego. For an ego, this evidence is what constitutes an Other ego.
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